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Akey question for organizational learning research is to identify opportunities and constraints for ﬁrms to gain usefulinformation from the activities and performance of other ﬁrms. We argue that market-level turnover events generate
and release vicarious information that small multiunit organizations can use to enhance their likelihood of survival. We
focus on two speciﬁc turnover events, ownership transfers and contemporaneous exit-entry pairs (cases in which both
outlet entry and outlet exit occur within the same market within the same time period), because these events are likely
to generate and release information without altering the total number of outlets in a market. We ﬁnd that the likelihood
of a multiunit owner’s outlet exit declines when there are many ownership transfers and exit-entry pairs in other markets
where the owner also operates outlets. We conclude that these turnover events, even in just one market where a small
multiunit organization is present, generate vicarious information substantial enough to increase the survival likelihood of all
outlets of that multiunit organization. Our theory and supporting results show how organizational learning-based arguments
can be combined with our knowledge of multiunit organizations to build a theory of relationships between geographically
separated turnover events.
Key words : multiunit organizations; small business; geography; vicarious learning; knowledge transfer
Research in organizational theory and economics has
explored the sources and effects of organizational learn-
ing (Argote 1999). Many studies ﬁnd that ﬁrms learn
from their own experience (e.g., Levinthal and March
1993, Darr et al. 1995, Kale et al. 2002). In paral-
lel, though, organizational research has long recognized
that ﬁrms adapt by imitating (Alchian 1950) or react-
ing to (Nash 1950, Chen and MacMillan 1992) others’
strategies. Scholars increasingly argue that ﬁrms gain
information from others’ experiences (Baum and Ingram
1998, Miner and Haunschild 1995, Shaver and Flyer
2000) and change their own activities based on that
information (Miner et al. 1999, Kim 2000). Following
research that refers to learning from others as vicarious
learning (Huber 1991), we refer to information emerg-
ing from others’ activities and performance as vicarious
information.
The goal of this paper is to develop and test the-
ory regarding a common but underemphasized source of
marketplace information: market-level turnover events.
We focus on two types of turnover events: ownership
transfers and contemporaneous outlet exits and entries
within the same industry and market, which we refer
to as “exit-entry pairs.” This focus allows us to build
on work by Ingram and Baum (1997) and Miner et al.
(1999), which discusses information generated by a sim-
pler type of turnover event: business exits. We argue that
ownership transfers and exit-entry pairs generate and
release vicarious information about viable strategies into
the marketplace environment, but without the competi-
tive dynamics that accompany business exits. Either of
these turnover events, transfers or exit-entry pairs, may
result in new owners in a market who decide to apply
new business strategies and serve new niches. Incum-
bents can learn by observing these changes. In addition,
ownership transfers may result in increased productiv-
ity at the same location (Caves 1998, McGuckin and
Nguyen 1995), suggesting that they generate valuable
information for observers.
Expanding these arguments to a multiunit setting, we
apply the logic behind the ﬁndings of Darr et al. (1995)
that multiunit franchisee owners transferred cost-saving
knowledge based on one outlet’s experience to other out-
lets they operated. We argue that, if owners beneﬁt from
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the vicarious information that ownership transfers and
exit-entry pairs generate and release, then the occurrence
of these events in the proximity of any of the multi-
unit owner’s outlets should increase the probability of
survival of all outlets that the owner operates.
Beyond the contribution to the organizational learning
literature, our focus on cross-market effects of turnover
events provides a new vista for work in population ecol-
ogy and the turnover literature in economics.1 Those lit-
eratures have long focused on the relationships between
various turnover events, but they have been limited
to events within the same product market or across
proximate geographic markets. The arguments that we
develop about multiunit organizations outline an embry-
onic theory of how information ﬂows link turnover
events across geographically dispersed populations.
We test our hypotheses by analyzing the exit rates of
outlets of single-unit and small multiunit organizations
in three industries in Texas during the 1990s: drug stores,
pizza restaurants, and video rental outlets. We deﬁne an
event as an outlet exit only if the outlet shuts down or
the location converts to an entirely different type of busi-
ness. We do not consider ownership transfers to be exits
because we wish to analyze outlets that have failed in
some way. Many owners who sell their outlets receive a
good price and thus have not failed at all.
From the beginning of 1991 through the end of 1999,
7,671 outlets afﬁliated with single-unit owners or small
multiunit owners operated in Texas in these three indus-
tries, of which 3,525 exited. We exclude from our popu-
lation outlets afﬁliated with national or regional brands,
either via ownership or franchise relationships. Small
nonfranchisee, multiunit organizations should be most
likely to act based on vicarious information because
they typically make operating decisions without the stan-
dardized routines of franchisors or large national chains.
Therefore, they are the most appropriate objects for this
study.
The paper proceeds as follows. The background sec-
tion identiﬁes information sources that owners of small
businesses use, drawing on the scholarly literature and
information that emerged from our own interviews of
small business owners, and reviews existing work that
has considered how outlet-level exits and entries inﬂu-
ence survival. We then develop hypotheses regarding
the beneﬁts generated by vicarious information resulting
from ownership transfers and exit-entry pairs. Finally,
we test the hypotheses and discuss the results.
Background
Information Seeking by Small Businesses
Surveys conducted by scholars of small business man-
agement suggest that small ﬁrms analyze their competi-
tors and use the analyses to innovate. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the premise that ﬁrms will be aware of
transfers, exits, and entries taking place in their vicinity,
that these events contain valuable information, and that
owners beneﬁt from using this information.
Several studies show that small businesses analyze
their competitors. Brush (1992) surveyed 66 new man-
ufacturing ventures with average annual production of
$3 million and found that 69% regularly or continuously
collect information regarding their competitors’ strate-
gies, while 79% collect information about competitors’
products. In addition, 52% collected information about
new entrants into their market. Based on surveys of
132 organizations with 100 employees or less, Johnson
and Kuehn (1987) found that managers of small ﬁrms
spend more time gathering information about the mar-
ketplace, including competitors and entrants, than they
did about growth issues (e.g., new facilities, achieving
economies of scale) or about technology (e.g., improv-
ing products and processes).
How do small businesses gather information about
competitors? Johnson and Kuehn (1987) found that
customers, employees, and suppliers were most likely
to supply marketplace information. Fann and Smeltzer
(1989) conﬁrmed this result for a sample of 48 small
businesses. They emphasized that customers were an
important conduit through which ﬁrms received informa-
tion about their competitors. Those authors also found
that turnover events such as exits and entries into
new markets are two of the four most important types
of information about competitors for a ﬁrm’s long-
range planning. Finally, small businesses appear to gain
ideas regarding innovation from observing competitors.
Hartman et al. (1994) found that information about com-
petitors is the second most important source that spurs
innovation, behind only ongoing analysis of the ﬁrm’s
own products. Interestingly, competitor information was
more important in this regard than information about
either customers or employees.
Interviews with Pizza Restaurant and Video Store
Owners
For this study, we interviewed 12 owners of pizza restau-
rants and video rental stores regarding the importance of
learning about their competitors’ activities and speciﬁ-
cally about the role of ownership transfers in releasing
information. The interviews offer supplemental support
for our theory and statistical analysis. Six of 12 owners
that we contacted reported that they were aware of own-
ership transfers at competitors’ locations and that they
gained information as a result of the ownership transfer.
Three others said that they do monitor their competitors,
but that they were not aware of any ownership trans-
fers that had taken place in their vicinity. The remaining
three told us they never pay attention to competitors,
because there were either too few or too many to keep
track of.
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How did the owners ﬁnd out about ownership trans-
fers? All six owners that had identiﬁed ownership trans-
fer information mentioned that customers told them
about ownership changes, three stated that vendors men-
tioned the changes, and three stated that they heard
the news from employees. In addition, one video store
owner and one pizza restaurant owner emphasized that
the incumbent owners knew each other and relayed such
information among themselves. One owner stated that
new owners sometimes came to their store to introduce
themselves. More details from the interviews follow
below.
Information Contained in Outlet Exits and Entries
Previous academic work on turnover has focused on
how business exits and entries inﬂuence the survival of
incumbent ﬁrms and outlets. Research shows that busi-
ness exits inﬂuence the survival rates of competing busi-
nesses (Ingram and Baum 1997, Kim 2000). In part, the
survival beneﬁts arise because the exits generate vicari-
ous information about the ineffectiveness of the exiting
ﬁrm’s strategies. For example, the exit of an airline such
as People’s Express that offered only low-cost service
could induce surviving airline ﬁrms to implement a dif-
ferentiation strategy (Miner et al. 1999).
In addition to generating vicarious information,
though, business exits involve unrelated issues that
would affect the likelihood of exit of other outlets in the
vicinity. Carroll and Delacroix (1983) argue that exits
free resources for surviving outlets and signal that there
is low demand in a market. That is, exits allow resources
such as customers and employees to become available
for other existing organizations, while signaling that a
market is suffering from the “noxious countervailing
force” of insufﬁcient demand (Carroll and Delacroix
1983, p. 279). Resource availability should decrease the
exit probabilities of multiunit owners’ outlets, as should
the presence of vicarious information, while signals of
insufﬁcient demand should be associated with increased
probabilities of exit.
Much like the case of exits, entries also have multi-
ple inﬂuences that can affect the survival of incumbent
ﬁrms or outlets. On one hand, entries provide new infor-
mation to incumbents about appropriate strategies and
routines. On the other hand, entries lead to increased
competition and fewer resources for incumbent outlets
(e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss 1991, Toivanen and Waterson
2005).
In contrast to entries and exits, ownership transfers
and contemporaneous exit-entry pairs in a market are
turnover events that do not change the number of out-
lets in a market. We focus on ownership transfers and
exit-entry pairs in markets in which an owner operates,
other than the market of the outlet at risk. This strat-
egy further isolates the effects of vicarious information
from other mechanisms that may affect survival rates.
We do not make hypotheses about the effect of transfers
or exit-entry pairs in the same-market as the outlet at
risk. Though same-market turnover events are likely
to release important vicarious information, the trans-
fers have other consequences that may confound any
observable effect on outlet performance or survival. For
example, McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) examined how
ownership transfers in the form of acquisitions affect
incumbent performance, but the mechanisms involved
tougher direct competition from new, more productive
owners. Alternatively, changing demographic or eco-
nomic conditions in a market might yield many own-
ership transfers and few exits in the same market, but
the relationship between the two may not be causal.2
Nonetheless, we do include same-market turnover events
in our empirical analysis as important control variables.
Hypotheses
The Effects of Ownership Transfers on the
Likelihood of Exit
Ownership transfers are cases in which new owners
undertake operation of existing business outlets. We
argue that ownership transfers generate and release
vicarious information. Ownership transfers at the retail
and service outlet level are visible events. Customers,
suppliers, and direct competitors are likely to be aware
of a transfer from a change in physical appearance at the
outlet or perhaps from a prominently displayed “under
new management” banner. As we found in our inter-
views, many owners are aware of these transfers and
pay attention to them. They are able to gain informa-
tion about the transfers not only from their own direct
observation but also indirectly through their networks
of customers and suppliers. We discuss two reasons
why transfers are likely to generate and release valuable
information to competitors: the ﬁrst related to different
strategies used by the new and previous owner of the
transferred outlet, and the second related to the move-
ment of employees following an ownership transfer.
Economists have developed and tested the matching
theory of ownership transfers. According to the logic of
this theory, ownership transfers take place because exter-
nal shocks over time reduce the ﬁt between an existing
owner’s skills and those required for successful ongoing
operations (Caves 1998). Individuals whose skills would
bring greater value from an existing location should
be willing to pay the existing owner (who lacks those
skills) a premium, relative to what the existing owner
could earn by operating the outlet, to assume ownership.
Consistent with this argument, McGuckin and Nguyen
(1995) found that productivity went up after ownership
changes at manufacturing plants. While the matching
theory does not discuss operating changes explicitly, it
follows that the new owner will make changes in the
strategies, routines, and policies of the organization to
gain productivity beneﬁts from their skills.
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Even if new owners do not possess superior capa-
bilities, organizational change may result merely from
their belief that they can extract improved performance
from their outlets (see, e.g., Camerer and Lovallo 1999,
on overconﬁdence). On the one hand, Sorenson and
Waguespack (2005) report that such beliefs may result
in self-conﬁrming outcomes. In our setting, owners may
invest greater effort in the markets they believe have the
most potential, even if there is no objective reason for
them to be optimistic. Their increased efforts should be
observable and should generate vicarious information.
On the other hand, Kalnins (2005) found that owners
who were the most bullish before entry about a given
market’s potential were the most likely to exit that mar-
ket. The actions of overconﬁdent owners also yield valu-
able vicarious information (Bernardo and Welch 2001).
As we noted above, ownership transfers are events
that are visible by direct observation and via indirect
communication from customers and suppliers. Thus,
owners of outlets proximate to that undergoing an own-
ership change should be able to analyze the ownership
transfer as a “natural experiment,” with the ownership
change acting as the manipulation. They can compare
the actions of the previous owner and the new owner
and identify features to incorporate into their own strate-
gies. For example, an ownership transfer that involves
a change of décor may suggest to the multiunit own-
ers that they should avoid remodeling outlets in a fash-
ion similar to the transferred outlet under its previous
owner. The transfer may allow the multiunit owner not
only to conclude that particular strategies or routines of
the previous owner were ineffective, but also that the
new owner’s approach may be superior. Even if the new
owners in a market are less likely to succeed than their
predecessors, their use of new business strategies and
service of new niches can provide incumbents with valu-
able information. Incumbent owners can observe their
initial performance and evaluate whether their strategies
should be copied or avoided.
The owners we interviewed had varied opinions on
whether competition became tougher after ownership
transfers. One owner stated that there was “less [com-
petition]; we get some of those customers that used to
go to the previous owner’s store,” while another stated,
“Depends. Sometimes tougher competition, sometimes
[we] get lucky and fresh ownership with lack of expe-
rience, then it goes in our favor.” Overall, ﬁve of the
six interviews noticed new owners doing things differ-
ently from the previous owners: substantial remodel-
ing, new product mix, new displays, new menu items,
and new types of promotion. Importantly, four said that
they had adopted speciﬁc practices as a result of their
observations.
A second mechanism through which incumbent ﬁrms
can gain information from an ownership transfer is the
turnover of employees from the outlet whose ownership
is changing, whether or not the outlet’s productivity has
improved posttransfer. Ownership transfers increase the
likelihood that employees will leave the ﬁrm. Sorenson
and Audia (2000) and Klepper and Sleeper (2002) argue
that some departing employees start their own new ven-
tures, often in the vicinity of their prior employer. In
addition, though, competitors hire many other depart-
ing employees. Employees often serve as repositories for
tacit knowledge (Argote and Darr 2001) and take sub-
stantial information regarding the strategies and opera-
tions from their old employer to the new (Almeida and
Kogut 1999). Hence, incumbents in the vicinity can ben-
eﬁt from the information provided by employees that
they hire away from other outlets undergoing ownership
changes. In this case, the ownership transfer facilitates
the release of information.
Two pizza store owners mentioned to us that employee
turnover is the primary means through which they
acquire important vicarious information, as well as a
way they ﬁnd out about ownership transfers. One owner
noted how ownership transfers affect employees, stating,
“Cooks don’t like it when businesses change owners.”
This owner stated that he has hired many employees that
way. These employees have provided information about
quality of various vendors, ingredient proportions, and
substitutable products.
The last piece of logic that our ﬁrst hypothesis
requires is that owners can transfer information among
their outlets. Evidence exists that owners transfer infor-
mation from outlet to outlet, implying that vicarious
information can diffuse among outlets of the same mul-
tiunit owner. Darr et al. (1995) found that cost-reducing
information at pizza restaurants based on an outlet’s own
experience was shared with outlets of the same mul-
tiunit owner. Similarly, Mitchell et al. (2002) showed
that capabilities transferred from nursing home chains
to their newly acquired outlets, and Ingram and Simons
(2002) observed transfers between kibbutzim of the
same federation. Within the small multiunit business
organizations that we study here, the mechanism for
the transfer of information from one outlet to others
is straightforward: Most often, the owners transfer the
information themselves during their visits to their indi-
vidual outlets. Employees typically are willing to pro-
vide the owners with information, and the owners share
the information with their other locations during their
next visit.
Hypothesis 1. The greater the number of ownership
transfers that occur in other markets in which a multiu-
nit owner operates, the lower the probability of exit of
an outlet of the multiunit owner.
Ownership Transfers with and Without Changes of
Business Name
In this section, we argue that, while all ownership trans-
fers should provide some vicarious information, trans-
fers of outlets that change the “doing business as” name
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provide more vicarious information than those that keep
the original name. Some outlets will be sold because
owners simply wish to retire or change their lifestyle.
In such cases, the business often was doing well before
the sale, and the new owner will maintain the strategies
and operational routines of the previous owner. Further,
the retention of the business name is a strong signal to
customers that the products or services will be the same.
In fact, a new owner who keeps the name often pays a
goodwill premium for that name beyond the value of the
physical property and equipment, speciﬁcally because
the name and its associated products, strategies, and rou-
tines are of value to a group of customers.
Thus, incumbents within a market are likely to learn
more from ownership transfers involving name changes,
which typically indicate that the ﬁrst owner was strug-
gling or had poor prospects. Incumbents can observe the
strategies and routines of the new owner and compare
how they differ from those of the exiting owner. Our
argument here is similar to that of Kim (2000), who
argued that near-failure experiences contain more vicari-
ous information than outright failures. Ownership trans-
fers with name changes are likely to be near failures,
which will contain information not only about routines
or strategies that do not suit a particular market, but also
about the potentially viable strategies that new owners
initiate following the transfer.
Hypothesis 2. Ownership transfers with a change in
business name that occur in other markets in which a
multiunit owner operates will reduce the probability of
exit of an outlet of the multiunit owner more than own-
ership transfers that keep the same name.
Exit-Entry Pairs Within a Market
Like ownership transfers, outlet-level entries and exits
contain vicarious information about strategies and rou-
tines that may be useful for others in the market. A
new outlet’s routines and strategies may be particularly
worthy of imitation, while ﬁrms will commonly want to
avoid the routines and strategies of a failed outlet. As we
noted above, though, entries and exits also produce con-
founding effects beyond vicarious information. Entries
reduce available resources but signal a market’s viabil-
ity, while exits free resources but also signal insufﬁcient
demand.
Exit-entry pairs are cases in which an entry is matched
by an exit during the same time period in the same mar-
ket. More so than cases of exit or entry alone, exit-entry
pairs give others the opportunity to learn vicariously.
Managers and owners of other outlets can observe the
strategies and routines of the outlet that exits and asso-
ciate them with the failure of the outlet, while associ-
ating the strategies and routines of the new outlet with
at least one ﬁrm’s assessment of successful strategies.
We hypothesize that owners will transfer this informa-
tion from their markets with exit-entry pairs to all their
other outlets and therefore will be less likely to exit at
any of their locations. We contrast exit-entry pairs with
excess entries and exits, where excess entries are entries
that exceed the number of exits during the same time
period in the same market, and excess exits are exits that
exceed the number of entries.
Hypothesis 3a. The greater the number of exit-entry
pairs that occur in other markets in which a multiunit
owner operates, the lower the probability of exit of an
outlet of the same multiunit owner.
Hypothesis 3b. The effect of exit-entry pairs that oc-
cur in other markets in which a multiunit owner operates
(Hypothesis 3a) will be signiﬁcantly stronger than the
sum of the separate effects arising from excess entries
and exits that occur in other markets in which the mul-
tiunit owner operates.
Research Design
Data
We focus on the survival and exit of nonfranchised out-
lets within three industries in Texas between 1991 and
1999: drug stores, pizza restaurants, and video rental
outlets. We analyze the occurrence of 3,525 exits among
7,671 outlets of single-unit and small multiunit organiza-
tions, which we deﬁne as owning from one to 20 outlets.
We exclude outlets afﬁliated with franchisors. Of these
7,671 outlets, 2,835 are drug stores, 2,143 are pizza
restaurants, and 2,693 are video rental outlets.
We chose these industries because of their extensive
turnover, including many entries, exits, and ownership
transfers. During our period of study, there were 631
ownership transfers in these three industries where the
new owner assumed a new business name and 851 where
the business name remained the same after the change of
owner. There were 1,640 cases of exit-entry pairs in the
same zip code in the same time period. We use zip codes
as empirically convenient measures of geographic prox-
imity because they commonly share transportation and
other economic and social features for which vicarious
information is relevant. We explore alternative market
deﬁnitions in the sensitivity analyses described below.
While we believe that vicarious information will also
help outlets afﬁliated with franchisors and with large
national chains, we exclude these outlets from our anal-
ysis because they are more complex organizations. Fran-
chisors often constrain their franchisees’ ability to react
to vicarious information. The franchisor is typically
responsible for developing and enforcing organizational
routines (Knott 2001), and franchisees are often forbid-
den to make “strategic local responses” such as changing
a menu item to serve local tastes (Bradach 1998, p. 23).
Nonetheless, we discuss sensitivity analyses that include
franchisor-afﬁliated outlets.
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Further, the analysis of small nonfranchisee owners
reduces the possibility that an exit-reducing effect on
a multiunit owner’s outlet that appears to stem from
turnover events in the other markets actually results from
multimarket interaction, a la Baum and Korn (1996) or
McGrath et al. (1998). Of 1,482 ownership transfers in
our data, only 20 involved outlets with direct multimar-
ket contact with the owner of the outlet at risk.
We chose Texas because the State Comptroller’s Of-
ﬁce provided us with complete entry and exit data from
1990 through 1999 at the business outlet level, includ-
ing address, business name, owner name and address,
and entry and exit date. Because we need year of exit
and entry data preceding each at-risk period to test our
hypotheses, we begin our analysis of outlets at risk in
January 1991. To our knowledge, Texas is the only state
that makes such detailed business data available. Many
states do not provide data because of conﬁdentiality,
while some states (e.g., California) provide information
only about existing outlets without detailing entry or
exit dates. Fortunately, Texas is a large and varied state,
so it represents types of locations that exist throughout
the United States, such as urban and rural areas, areas
along major highways, and coastal resorts. Therefore,
our results are likely to generalize to other North Amer-
ican markets. We note that Kalnins and Mayer (2004)
previously conducted a survival analysis using the pizza
restaurant data, while no academic study has used the
drug store or video data sets. Even for the pizza data,
no studies have analyzed the turnover variables of theo-
retical interest here.
We include as observations the outlets of single-
unit owners even though they had no other outlets that
could help them gather vicarious information to use in
other markets. Outlets of single-unit owners add rele-
vant information for the identiﬁcation of control vari-
ables, and they act as a falsiﬁcation test. A strong test
of our hypotheses should ﬁnd that, while multiunit own-
ers enjoy higher survival rates, single-unit ﬁrms in the
same market do not beneﬁt from ownership transfers or
exit-entry pairs in other markets where their multiunit
neighbors operate. We note that sensitivity analyses that
excluded the outlets of single-unit owners as observa-
tions in our analyses did not change any of the results
we present below.
Method and Variable Deﬁnitions
We used event history analysis to test the hypotheses.
Speciﬁcally, we used parametric hazard models, which
require that a functional form for the transition rates be
speciﬁed. We estimated regressions using the piecewise
exponential, Gompertz, and Weibull forms. Because our
results did not differ based on the model used, we
present results using the piecewise exponential model,
which is a ﬂexible approach that allows the hazard rate
to change over time. Following Blossfeld and Rohwer
(1995, p. 116), this model takes the following form:
rt= expl +Al	 (1)
In Equation (1), l is the constant for the lth time
period. The hazard rate can vary across time periods
without restriction but is assumed to be constant within
a time period. The A vector contains the covariates,
and the estimates of the coefﬁcients appear in the l
vector. In the analysis that follows we estimate models
with period effects with three time periods correspond-
ing to outlets aged 0–2 years, 3–5 years, and greater than
5 years. Because the values of all our covariates of the-
oretical interest change over time, we split the life histo-
ries of all outlets into yearly spells and set all covariates
for each spell to their values at the beginning of that
year (see, e.g., Ingram and Baum 1997). We then esti-
mated the parameters using maximum likelihood anal-
yses, clustering on location to generate robust standard
errors.
Many of the drug stores, pizza restaurants, and video
rental outlets were in business before 1990, meaning
that part of our population is left truncated—outlets that
entered and exited before 1990 are not in the population.
Including outlets founded before 1990 but exiting after
1990 in the analysis does not cause left-censoring prob-
lems because the Texas data sets contain information of
the founding dates, even if those are before 1990. For
example, the event history model will only analyze an
outlet founded in 1985 with others that have survived
until the ﬁfth year. The outlet will never be directly com-
pared to outlets in the ﬁrst four years after founding.
Thus, the analysis avoids problems of left censoring (see
Guo 1993; Stata Corp 2001, pp. 441–446).
The dependent variable for the event history analy-
sis is outlet-level exit. Outlets are at risk of exit until
they have permanently closed down. We do not consider
outlets to have exited merely due to changes of own-
ership or business name, as long as someone is oper-
ating the same type of business at that location. We
note that ﬁner-grained ﬁnancial performance data are not
available for a large group of privately owned outlets.
Because the coarseness of exit as a dependent variable
may obscure some effects of vicarious information (e.g.,
the information improves proﬁts but is not strong enough
to inﬂuence exit rates), any effects that are observed to
be reducing exit are likely to be particularly strong.
The two main independent variables of theoretical
interest are the count of ownership transfers within the
same industry that take place in other zip codes in which
a multiunit owner has outlets (Variable 1, Hypothesis 1)
and the count of exit-entry pairs within the same indus-
try that take place in other zip codes in which a multiu-
nit owner has outlets (Variable 4, Hypothesis 3a). The
counts are calculated in the year before each period in
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which the outlet is at risk. Sensitivity analyses found
results at the same levels of signiﬁcance using a two-
year period before each spell, even though the analysis
required the removal of all observations from 1991 from
the population so that the additional year’s lagged inde-
pendent variables could be calculated.
To calculate the transfers in these other zips vari-
able (Variable 1) for an outlet x of a multiunit owner
that owns outlets x, y, and z in three different mar-
kets (zip codes), we count the number of ownership
transfers in the vicinity of outlets y and z in the previ-
ous year, including only those of nonfranchised outlets
whose owners own 20 or fewer outlets. Similarly, we
include the counts in the zip codes of x and z in the
variable for outlet y. Variables 2 and 3 are Variable 1
split into two separate counts, depending on whether the
ownership transfer involved a change of business name
or not.
We determined that a transfer occurred when an indi-
vidual with a different surname was listed as an outlet’s
new owner. In some cases, the outlet was listed with
multiple serial owners, where the old owner was a per-
son or a corporation and the new owner was a different
corporation. We checked such cases against the Texas
Secretary of State’s incorporation database to determine
the actual owners. If the same individual appeared as an
owner of both corporations, we concluded that an own-
ership transfer did not take place.
To calculate the exit-entry pairs in these other zips
variable (Variable 4) for an outlet x of a multiunit owner
that owns outlets x, y, and z in three different markets
(zip codes), we count the number of pairs of exits and
entries in the vicinity of outlet y and the number of pairs
of exits and entries in the vicinity of z in the previous
year. Like the case of transfers, both the exits and entries
must be of nonfranchised outlets with small owners and
both must be in the same market. On the one hand, the
count of exit-entry pairs can be large or small, and the
amount of net entry can still be zero. On the other hand,
if outlet y only has exits in its vicinity and outlet z only
has entries in its vicinity, the exits and entries are not
considered to be a pair. In this case, the value of the exit-
entry pairs in these other zips variable would be zero,
but net entries and exits will be greater than zero. The
exits in the vicinity of outlet y would be included in the
excess exits in these other zips variable (Variable 5), and
the entries close to z would be included in the excess
entries in these other zips variable (Variable 6).
We did not base hypotheses around the excess exit and
entry variables because their role as a consistent source
of vicarious information remains unclear. If a market
experienced many exits due to insufﬁcient demand, these
events will provide little valuable vicarious information
that an owner can use in other markets. Instead, the
exits simply mean that a particular market is unattractive.
Similarly, many entries may merely signal high growth
of a new market.
The ﬁnal control variable counted across all the other
markets with a multiunit owner’s outlets is the sum of
existing outlets in these zips, excluding the zip of the
outlet at risk and the contiguous zips (Variable 7). Zip
codes with more total outlets are more likely to expe-
rience entries, exits, and ownership transfers. Thus, the
presence of the total existing outlet variables ensures that
simple counts of outlets of the same industry are not
generating the results attributed to ownership transfers
or exit-entry pairs. We do not include a squared term
for this variable because there is little theoretical reason
to believe that a competition effect exists across mar-
kets, but sensitivity analyses that did include the squared
term did not reduce the level of support for any of our
hypotheses. We also note that results remained signiﬁ-
cant (marginally so in the case of ownership transfers)
when the existing outlets variable was not included in
the regressions.
To ensure that the markets of the multiunit owner’s
other outlets are geographically distinct from the market
of that owner’s outlet at risk, we do not include counts
in zip codes that are contiguous to that of the zip code of
the outlet at risk in Variables 1–7. Ownership transfers in
neighboring zip codes might really be in the same mar-
ket with those within the zip code of the outlet at risk.
As described immediately below, the turnover events in
all contiguous zip codes are counted in the control vari-
ables for turnover events in the same market as the outlet
at risk.
We include turnover control variables for the same
market as the outlet at risk (Variables 8–13). In partic-
ular, we include the count of ownership transfers, exit-
entry pairs, excess exits, and excess entries, summed
not only in the same zip code as the outlet at risk, but
also across all contiguous zip codes. We also include
the traditional density variables found to be signiﬁcant
in many population ecology studies (see Carroll and
Hannan 2000, p. 218), the count of existing outlets in a
market and its squared term, again using the same zip
code and the contiguous zip codes. Sensitivity analyses
using only the counts in the same zip as the outlet at risk
did not alter in any way the signs or signiﬁcance levels
of the variables of theoretical interest (Variables 1–4).
However, there were important differences in the signif-
icance levels of the control variables themselves. These
are discussed in the Results section.
Third, we include three measures of market condi-
tions. We include zip code population and per capita
income from the 1990 census (Variables 14 and 15) to
identify markets that ﬁrms may consider to be larger and
more lucrative. In addition, retail growth in zip (Vari-
able 16) records the count of entries less exits of retail
outlets in the two years previous to the current spell.
Sensitivity analyses report no signiﬁcant differences in
results if these variables are broadened to include the
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contiguous zip codes, much like the counts of turnover
events.
Finally, we include several owner and outlet charac-
teristics. First, we include a ﬁrm’s size in number of
outlets (Variable 17) and a squared term (Variable 18).
Larger ﬁrms operate in more zip codes and thus will
be able to observe more ownership transfers. This con-
trol ensures that results regarding ownership transfers in
other zips do not arise from a simple size effect. Sec-
ond, we include the experience of an owner in the vicin-
ity of the outlet at the time of the outlet’s founding,
which Huber (1991) refers to as congenital experience
(Variable 19). This variable is measured as in Baum and
Ingram (1998), using a square-root discount factor, and
using the closest 25 outlets to be consistent with Kalnins
and Mayer (2004). Third, we include a dummy variable
for whether an outlet has transferred ownership (Vari-
able 20), which allows us to determine whether trans-
fers improve performance as per the matching theory
we discussed above. Fourth, we include the logged dis-
tance from the outlet to its owner’s headquarters (Vari-
able 21). Fifth, as we discussed earlier, we include three
cohorts of outlet age (Variables 22–24). Finally, though
not shown in the tables (to save space), we included sep-
arate industry/year intercepts. In other words, there is
a separate intercept for drugs stores 1992, drugs stores
1993, pizza restaurants 1996, etc. Thus, the baseline fail-
ure rate can vary for each year for each industry. Table 1
reports descriptive statistics and correlations for all the
variables.
Results
Core Results
Table 2 reports four exponential hazard models that ana-
lyze likelihood of outlet exit. The ﬁrst model includes
the two main count variables for other zips with out-
lets of the same owner. The transfers in these other
zips variable (Variable 1) tests Hypothesis 1, while the
entry/exit pairs in these other zips variable (Variable 4)
tests Hypothesis 3a. The negative and statistically signif-
icant coefﬁcients on both of these variables show strong
support for both hypotheses. The more ownership trans-
fers and exit-entry pairs that occur in other markets in
which a multiunit owner operates, the lower the proba-
bility of exit of an outlet of the same multiunit owner.
Further, a chi-squared comparison of the coefﬁcient of
the exit-entry pairs variable with the sum of the excess
entries in these other zips variable and the excess exits in
these other zips variable (Variables 5 and 6) is displayed
at the bottom of the columns associated with Model 1.
The signiﬁcant chi-squared statistic tests Hypothesis 3b:
The effects of exit-entry pairs that occur in other mar-
kets in which a multiunit owner operates are signiﬁcantly
stronger than the separate effects of entries and exits that
occur in those other markets.
To test Hypothesis 2, Model 2 splits the transfers in
these other zips variable into the two types of transfers:
transfers with a change of name and transfers that keep
the same name. The analysis ﬁrst reports that both types
of transfers lead to a lower chance of exit in other zips,
in parallel with Hypothesis 1. The split of the ownership
transfers variable demonstrates signiﬁcant exit-reducing
effects for transfers that have changed business name
and marginally signiﬁcant effects for those that have not
changed business names.
To test Hypothesis 2, a chi-square test comparing the
magnitude of the coefﬁcients of these two variables is
displayed at the bottom of the columns for the second
model. While the coefﬁcients have the expected rela-
tive magnitude, the results do not support Hypothesis 2.
Although the transfers with a change of name variable
has a coefﬁcient that is larger both in absolute magnitude
and in terms of statistical signiﬁcance, the chi-squared
test on the difference between the two variables has an
insigniﬁcant value of 0.87. Nonetheless, the direction of
the results suggests that transfers with a change of name
have the most impact.
We note that the excess exits in these other zips and
excess entries in these other zips with outlets of same
owner (Variables 5 and 6) were insigniﬁcant. While
these were control variables in this study, the nonef-
fect of the exits variable may be surprising because of
past work (e.g., Miner et al. 1999) that discusses the
ability of ﬁrms to beneﬁt from the presence of exits.
While multiunit owners could transmit any knowledge
acquired based on exits in the vicinity of their outlets,
much like they appear able to do for the case of own-
ership transfers, it is not clear what proportion of exits
are in fact a source of vicarious information. If a mar-
ket experienced many exits due to insufﬁcient demand,
for example, these events do not likely provide valuable
vicarious information that an owner can use in other
markets. Instead, as we noted above, it may only mean
that a particular market is not attractive.
In addition to the variables of theoretical interest, sev-
eral controls are signiﬁcant in Models 1 and 2. Most
important, we observe statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁ-
cients for the turnover events in the same market (Vari-
ables 8 and 9) of the same sign as those in the multiunit
owners’ other markets (Variables 1 and 4). Both owner-
ship transfers and the exit-entry pairs in the same mar-
ket as the outlet at risk have a negative and signiﬁcant
effect on the likelihood of exit, with the market deﬁ-
nition being the same zip code plus the contiguous zip
codes. However, we state three caveats regarding these
results. First, these variables are only marginally sig-
niﬁcant and only become signiﬁcant when we use this
broad deﬁnition of the local market. The variables are
not signiﬁcant when we include turnovers only if they
are in the same zip code as the outlet at risk. Second, the
coefﬁcients are far smaller than those for the transfers
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Table 2 Exponential Hazard Regressions on Outlet Exit (Nonfranchised Outlets of Single-Unit and Small Multiunit Owners—Up to
20 Units)
1: H1, H3a, H3b 2: H2 3: Contiguous zips 4: Falsiﬁcation test
Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error
Counts in other zips with outlets of
same owner
(1) Transfers in these other zips (H1:-) −0236∗∗ 0084 −0255∗∗ 0086 −0238∗∗ 0084
(2) Transfers with a change of name −0362∗ 0170
(3) Transfers that keep the same name −0177+ 0099
(4) Exit-entry pairs in these other −0356∗∗ 0099 −0361∗∗ 0099 −0378∗∗ 0101 −0354∗∗ 0099
zips (H3a:-)
(5) Excess exits in these other zips −0046 0050 −0047 0050 −0054 0051 −0046 0050
(6) Excess entries in these other zips 0020 0050 0021 0051 0003 0052 0021 0050
(7) Existing outlets (density) in these 0045∗∗ 0008 0045∗∗ 0008 0044∗∗ 0008 0045∗∗ 0008
other zips
Comparison test variables
(C1) Transfers 0033 0036 −0040 0034
(C4) Exit-entry pairs 0024 0034 −0030 0046
Counts in same market as outlet
at risk (same market= same zip
+ contiguous zips)
(8) Transfers in same market −0052+ 0028 −0052+ 0028 −0053+ 0028 −0053+ 0028
(9) Exit-entry pairs in same market −0046+ 0026 −0046+ 0026 −0046+ 0026 −0046+ 0026
(10) Excess exits in same market 0050 0035 0050 0035 0050 0035 0050 0035
(11) Excess entries in same market −0041 0041 −0041 0041 −0043 0041 −0044 0041
(12) Existing outlets (density) in same −0015+ 0008 −0015+ 0008 −0016+ 0008 −0015+ 0008
market
(13) Existing outlets (density) squared 0001∗ 0000 0001∗ 0000 0001∗ 0000 0001∗ 0000
Other controls
(14) Population of zip (10,000s) −0055 0126 −0053 0126 −0053 0126 0002 0129
(15) Income of zip ($10,000s) 0272+ 0160 0271+ 0160 0258 0160 0332∗ 0163
(16) Retail growth in zip (10s) 0089 0086 0087 0086 0091 0086 0090 0086
(17) Multiunit owner’s size (in number −0068∗∗ 0018 −0068∗∗ 0018 −0073∗∗ 0019 −0079∗∗ 0019
of outlets)
(18) Multiunit owner’s size squared 0002∗ 0001 0002∗ 0001 0003∗ 0001 0003∗∗ 0001
(19) Local congenital experience −0025 0031 −0023 0031 −0020 0031 −0022 0031
(20) Outlet has transferred ownership −0057 0048 −0057 0048 −0058 0048 −0057 0048
(21) Log distance to owner’s 0073∗∗ 0009 0072∗∗ 0009 0072∗∗ 0009 0073∗∗ 0009
HQ from outlet
(22) Outlet age: 0–2 years −3289∗∗ 0106 −3290∗∗ 0106 −3275∗∗ 0107 −3290∗∗ 0107
(23) Outlet age: 3–5 years −3200∗∗ 0104 −3201∗∗ 0104 −3187∗∗ 0105 −3200∗∗ 0105
(24) Outlet age: 6+ years −3454∗∗ 0100 −3455∗∗ 0100 −3442∗∗ 0101 −3453∗∗ 0101
Chi-squared tests for signiﬁcant H3b; 4> 5 + 6 624∗ H2; 2> 3 087 1> C1 906∗∗ 1> C1 487∗
relationships among variables 4> C4 1259∗∗ 4> C4 884∗∗
Pseudo log likelihood of regression −5703 −5703 −5702 −5702
Note. 3,525 failures, 7,671 outlets total at risk (36,015 total years at risk): All regressions include separate intercepts for each industry/year
combination.
∗p < 005; ∗∗p < 001; +p < 010 (two-tailed tests).
and exit-entry pairs in the multiunit owners’ other zip
codes. This suggests that some opposing force in the
local area is mitigating the effects of vicarious informa-
tion made available by the turnover events. Third, while
signiﬁcance of these variables supports the “same mar-
ket” equivalents of Hypotheses 1 and 3a, chi-square tests
(not shown) are unable to support Hypotheses 2 and 3b.
One factor that is encouraging about the broader def-
inition of local market is that the density variables
(counts of existing organizations) are signiﬁcant and
consistent with the basic ﬁndings of population ecology.
The density variable is positive and signiﬁcant while its
squared term is negative and signiﬁcant, demonstrating
the typical S-shaped curve that results from the forces
of legitimation and competition (see Carroll and Hannan
2000, p. 218). Our setting makes this ﬁnding interest-
ing because it presents some additional evidence that,
following Greve (2002), the density dependence results
hold in a microgeographic context. The density variables
are not signiﬁcant when only the same zip code is used.
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This suggests that we have accurately deﬁned a “local
market,” at least to the extent that legitimacy and com-
petition are concerned, by including the outlet counts in
contiguous zip codes. Regardless of the deﬁnition used,
or whether these “same market” counts (Variables 8–13)
are included at all, we found no variation in the coefﬁ-
cients of the turnover variables in the multiunit owners’
other zip codes (Variables 1–4).
Other control variables also deserve our attention.
Multiunit owner’s size (in number of outlets) (Variable
17) is strongly negative and signiﬁcant, and its squared
term (Variable 18) is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating
that owners with many outlets fail less often than their
smaller counterparts but that the beneﬁts decrease as the
owners possess more and more outlets and might even
turn around at the extremes of chain size. Further, log
distance to headquarters from outlet at risk (Variable 21)
was strongly signiﬁcant and positive, indicating that an
owner’s outlet is more likely to fail the more distant it
is from the owner’s headquarters location. Finally, we
note that congenital experience (Variable 19), found to
be signiﬁcant for the pizza restaurant data in Kalnins
and Mayer (2004), did not generalize to the drug stores
and video rental outlets.
Comparison Test of Ownership Transfers and Exit-
Entry Pairs in Contiguous Zip Codes. Model 3 includes
two additional “comparison test” variables (C1 and C4).
These variables record ownership transfers and exit-
entry pairs that occurred in the zip codes contiguous
to the multiunit owners’ other zip codes. These vari-
ables help assess whether the owners can gain vicarious
information not only in the immediate vicinity of their
outlets but also over a broader area. The insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcients of C1 and C4 in Model 3 show that there
is little beneﬁt from transfers in contiguous zip codes.
We conﬁrm this formally with chi-square tests, shown
at the bottom of the column for Model 3. The effects of
transfers and exit-entry pairs in the same zip code as an
owner’s other outlets are signiﬁcantly greater in absolute
magnitude.
This ﬁnding suggests that information gained at out-
lets outside the immediate vicinity of the outlet at risk
does not get transferred by the multiunit owners to their
other markets. But the same-market controls, the own-
ership transfers and exit-entry pairs in the zip codes
contiguous to that containing the outlet at risk, do
decrease the outlet’s likelihood of exit. So why should
the turnover events have no effect when they are in the
zip codes contiguous to those where multiunit owners
operate other outlets? We speculate that the employees
and managers of an outlet can pick up tacit knowledge
across a wider geographic area, perhaps in the vicinity of
their residences, that will beneﬁt their home outlet. This
information is less likely to be conveyed to the owner
and even less likely to be subsequently transferred to
outlets at a new location.
Falsiﬁcation Tests Using Outlets of Single-Unit Own-
ers. As we noted earlier, the outlets of single-unit own-
ers, which necessarily had no outlets in other zip codes
that could help them gather vicarious information, serve
as a useful falsiﬁcation test. We use them in Model 4 to
assess the following possible confounding issue: Even
though we have shown that outlets are less likely to fail
when their owners have outlets in other zip codes with
recent ownership transfers and exit-entry pairs, the pos-
sibility exists that the relationship is not causal. Perhaps,
for example, shifting demographics or greater economic
activity throughout a region cause both a high count of
transfers as well as lower exit rates for all outlets across
many zip codes, whether the outlets are multiunit or
single-unit owned.
Model 4 reports the falsiﬁcation test analysis. In this
model, we assigned to all the outlets of single-unit own-
ers the average counts of ownership transfers (Vari-
able C1) and exit-entry pairs (Variable C4) experienced
by the multiunit owners in their same zip at the same
time. In other words, C1 and C4 are the equivalent of
Variables 1 and 4. All multiunit owners receive values of
zero for the falsiﬁcation test Variables C1 and C4, while
all single-unit owners have values of zero for main Vari-
ables 1 and 4 by deﬁnition because their owners have
no other outlets where they can gather vicarious infor-
mation. If the Variables C1 and C4 are signiﬁcant in
the same direction as Variables 1 and 4 and not signif-
icantly different in size, then we would not be able to
refute the alternative possibility that regional economic
or demographic effects are driving both the high number
of transfers and exit-entry pairs and the lower exit rates.
As the results of Model 4 show, neither C1 nor C4
is signiﬁcant in the same direction as the main Vari-
ables 1 and 4. Further, the chi-square tests at the bottom
of the column for Model 4 that compare the magnitudes
of Variables C1 to 1 and C4 to 4 show that the variables
for the multiunit owners’ outlets are signiﬁcantly greater
in magnitude than the falsiﬁcation test variables. Sensi-
tivity analyses found similar results when we used the
maximum rather than the average value of the transfers
and exit-entry pair variables for the multiunit owners in
the same zip code when constructing Variables C1 and
C4 for the single-unit owner outlets.
We also estimated regressions (not shown) that only
include the outlets of single-unit owners. For this sub-
population, Variables C1 and C4 remain completely
insigniﬁcant. We conclude that regional economic and
demographic effects are not causing both the high values
of the ownership transfer and exit-entry pair variables
and the low exit rates.
Additional Robustness Tests. We conducted additional
robustness tests. First, we split the Texan population
into metropolitan (1,622 exits/3,671 outlets) and rural
(1,903 exits/4,000 outlets) subpopulations. We deﬁned
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metro areas as the 10 most populous counties in Texas,
which contain all the state’s major cities. We found
that Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3a, and Hypothesis 3b
hold for the metro subpopulation, and Hypothesis 1,
Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 3a hold for the rural sub-
population. The fact that Hypothesis 2 holds in the
rural subpopulation, when it did not hold in the com-
bined data, suggests that vicarious information from out-
let transfers with name changes may be particularly
valuable in more far-ﬂung regions, where information
sources may be weaker than in more extensively net-
worked urban populations.
Second, we split the population into two periods,
one from 1991 to 1994 (1,547 exits/4,994 outlets) and
one from 1995 to 1999 (1,978 exits/5,440 outlets).
For the ﬁrst period, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3a
were marginally supported, while for the second period
Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3a, and Hypothesis 3b were
supported.
Third, we analyzed the three industries separately.
All coefﬁcients had the expected signs, although signif-
icances varied somewhat.
• Drug stores (1,088 exits/2,355 outlets total): Hy-
pothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3b were supported, while
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3a were close to signiﬁcant
p < 0	20.
• Pizza restaurants (949 exits/2,143 outlets total):
Hypothesis 1 was supported, and the signs for all other
coefﬁcients were in the expected direction.
• Video rental stores (1,488 exits/2,693 outlets total):
All coefﬁcients had the expected signs, and Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 3a were close to signiﬁcant p < 0	12.
We can only speculate about differences among the
industries, but one possibility is that drug stores are a
more complicated business than pizza and video rentals
and that vicarious information is particularly valuable
in helping owners to reﬁne their activities. At the same
time, we emphasize that all three industries contributed
to the overall support for the hypotheses.
Fourth, we analyzed the exit of small franchisees,
both by adding them to the subpopulation of indepen-
dent owners and by treating them as a distinct sub-
population. The analyses in Table 2 excluded franchised
outlets from the set of observations and from the inde-
pendent variables. When we added the 1,703 outlets with
442 exits that were owned by small franchisees (using
our criterion of 20 or fewer outlets owned), both as
observations and to the count variables, our main results
become stronger than those reported in Table 2. Fur-
ther, when we analyzed the exits among only these 1,703
franchised outlets, including outlet counts of both fran-
chised and nonfranchised small owners in the indepen-
dent variables, we found support for Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 3a.
Finally, we are concerned that increasing market con-
centration in one of a multiunit owner’s markets could
lead to improved performance and even to a greater like-
lihood of survival of the owner’s outlets in other markets.
In other words, the owner may enjoy higher proﬁtability
as a result of the concentration and may then “buffer”
the outlets in other markets, a la Miner et al. (1990). If
this were true, our results might not come from vicarious
information at all. Ownership transfers and exit-entry
pairs could clearly increase concentration (e.g., Kim and
Singal 1993). To rule out this possibility, we replaced
Variables 1–7 with counts of transfers and exit-entry
pairs where only single-unit owners were involved. In
other words, we only counted as transfers cases where an
owner sells his or her sole outlet to another owner who
possesses no other outlets. In these cases, market con-
centration of the zip code does not change at all. Sim-
ilarly, we counted only those excess exits, entries, and
existing units owned by single-unit owners. We found
support for Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3a, and Hypothe-
sis 3b and conclude that changes in market concentration
could not be generating our results.
Limitations
A limitation of a study such as this that demonstrates a
relationship between a type of event (an ownership trans-
fer or exit-entry pair) and an outcome (outlet exit) is that
the study does not directly observe the causal role of any
particular mechanism. We suggested two main mecha-
nisms through which ownership transfers and exit-entry
pairs could provide beneﬁcial information to incumbent
multiunit owners: information regarding changes in strat-
egy that may have resulted in improved productivity
or proﬁtability, and speciﬁc information from personnel
who left the employ of the transferred outlet. While we
believe our strategy of studying the effect of ownership
transfers in the vicinity of a multiunit ﬁrm’s outlets in
other markets on the likelihood of exit of an outlet in
a given market isolated these mechanisms of vicarious
information from other turnover-related mechanisms that
may inﬂuence exit rates (e.g., changes in level of compe-
tition or signals of sufﬁcient or insufﬁcient demand), we
cannot determine which mechanism played the greatest
role, nor can we be certain that some other mechanism
that we have failed to imagine could be affecting the
results. Our interviews suggest that employee turnover
may be the primary mechanism, but this is anecdotal evi-
dence. Rigorous qualitative work that could distinguish
the relative role of these mechanisms would be a very
useful complement to this study.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study offers robust core results that some market
turnover events are associated with a greater likelihood
of survival of multiunit ﬁrms’ outlets: Outlets of multiu-
nit owners are less likely to exit if ownership transfers
or contemporaneous exits and entries take place in the
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vicinity of other outlets in different markets operated by
the same multiunit owner as the outlet at risk. We devel-
oped the theory that vicarious information is the causal
mechanism underlying this relationship. Our theory and
results support the idea that market-level turnover events
generate and release vicarious information into the local
business environment.
We focused on ownership transfers and exit-entry
pairs in other markets because they are market turnover
events that are likely to generate and release vicarious
information and because the informational mechanism
is less likely to be confounded with other competitive
dynamics. Potential vicarious learning beneﬁts also exist
for other market events such as exits (without entries in
the same time period in the same market) and entries
(without exits). For these cases, however, vicarious infor-
mation may be confounded with other signals regarding
demand provided to incumbent owners as well as any
change in competitive intensity in the market.
We argued that ownership transfers and exit-entry
pairs generate information by acting as real-world “natu-
ral experiments” from which proximately located outlets
of the same industry can beneﬁt. When outlets change
hands, the new owner often pursued different operating
strategies than the previous owner, hoping to improve
performance. Owners of incumbent outlets in the vicin-
ity can make inferences from such ownership transfers,
which they can then apply in the operation of all their
outlets. Owners can make similar inferences when exits
and entries take place contemporaneously in the same
market. They can view what a new outlet’s owner is
doing similarly and differently from the owner of the
exited location.
Ownership transfers and exit-entry pairs also act as
mechanisms to release information. Employees often
switch jobs and work for competitors after transfers and
exits. These employees can then take their information
to their new employers, who, in turn, can pass the infor-
mation along to other outlets that they own. Further, as
we argued, ownership transfers at the retail and service
outlet level are visible events. The transferred outlets
often receive attention from the local business commu-
nity, from reports of the transfer event in local business
journals, from discussion within the networks of buy-
ers and suppliers, or from the owners calling attention
to themselves via an “under new management” banner.
The attention also serves to release vicarious information
into the local business environment.
The theory developed here and the supportive results
that we present not only contribute to our understanding
of organizational learning and knowledge transfer, but
also suggest a basis for expanding the realm of popu-
lation ecology and the turnover literature in economics.
Those literatures have largely limited themselves to
events within the same market or geographically con-
tiguous markets. This paper has demonstrated how orga-
nizational learning-based arguments can be combined
with our understanding of multiunit organizations to
build a theory of relationships between turnover events
even with large distances between them.
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Endnotes
1Carroll and Hannan (2000) and Caves (1998) provide exten-
sive reviews of the ecology and turnover literatures, respec-
tively. The use of the term “turnover” originates from the
Caves article, which deﬁnes turnover events as consisting of
entries and exits, changes in market share, and changes in con-
trol (ownership transfers).
2Temporal autocorrelation within a market and spatial auto-
correlation across contiguous markets are related issues. Exits
may appear to beget exits within the same market, but this
appearance may result from a regional shock that spans mul-
tiple periods. Studying effects of turnover events in markets
not contiguous to that where the turnover event occurred min-
imizes these concerns as well.
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